Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 20, Number 3057, 14 January 1861 — [BY PONY EXPRESS.] GENERAL CASS AND THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ABOUT FORT MOULTRIE. [ARTICLE]

[ BY PONY EXPRESS.]

GENERAL CASS AND THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ABOUT FORT MOULTRIE.

No official statement has yet appeared of the precise points of difference between the President and General Cass. The following, from a Washington letter in the Boston Courier, gives the most detailed account of the matter we have seen. It is interesting, also, as giving the positions of General Scott and Secretary Floyd on the same subject The issue between the President and the Secretary of State is understood to have related exclusively to the question of reinforcing or of increasing the garrison at Fort Moultrie. General Scott has been in this city several days, and his opinion has been obtained as to the propriety or necessity, in a military point of view, of strengthening the command at the fort in question. ' The officer in command at the fort, deeming the garrison inadequate to its defense, has asked for an augmentation of force ; and the disagreement in the Cabinet arose from the question of complying with his requisition. General Scott, whose opinion is, of course, professional rather than political, is decidedly in favor of the augmentation. There is, at present, but one company in the garrison, which General Scott decides, as any military man would decide, to be wholly insufficient to resist any determined attack. The Secretary of War, as well as Mr. Cass, coincided with General Scott's opinion — being influenced in their judgment, Cass more particularly, by political as well as military considerations. The Secretary of War is supposed to be more in sympathy with South Carolina, and less unfavorably inclined towards her contemplated measure of secession than was the Secretary of State; but as a matter of just and commendable pride, he is said to have promised himself and to have pledged the Government that he will deliver the South Carolina, as well as other fortifications of the Union, intact to his successor in office. Cass, disapproving of secession, as a right as well as a matter of expediency and propriety, in the present position of South Carolina, maintains that the Government would be derelict in duty if it were to leave Fort Moultrie in its present condition, when there is reason to believe that an effort will soon be made to wrest it from our hands. To suffer the fort thus to pass from its control into the hands of a revolutionary State, would virtually be treachery en the part of the General Government. The President naturally desires to avoid, itpossible, a collision with South Carolina, and especially such a collision as he is firmly convinced will result from any movement whatever towards strengthening the fortifications on her coast. The purpose of South Carolina has been expressed to him privately, and has been announced publicly, to possess itself in due time — that is, when its act of secession has been consummated— those forts. She will claim them as her propei ty, and as indispensable to her safety in the new position she intends to assume, He has received assurances, such as he regards as sufficient, that South Carolina will do nothing to precipitate a collision with the General Government during the few remaining days of the present Administration. The simple declaratory act of secession cannot, without some overt act, bring on a collision— certainly not immediately. If these statements are reliable, they leave Buchanan in a much worse position than before. General Scott, the highest military authority in the country, is decidedly of opinion that the garrison at Fort Moultrie is not adequate to its defense. Major Anderson, the officer in command, has asked for reinforcements, as absolutely necessary to the performance of the duty which has been assigned him. The Secretary of the War Department concurs in the necessity and propriety of sending them, in spite of his sympathy with the action of South Carolina. General Cass, the head of the Cabinet, urges the duty of complying with the request of Major Anderson, as not only essential to the maintenance of the fortress, but as necessary to protect the General Government from the suspicion of treachery. ; ■■■':'-'_. Against all these urgent representations, based upon common sense and reinforced by professional experience and political wisdom, Buchanan opposes an obstinate refusal. And that, too, after he has been privately assured by the authorities of South Carolina that she intends to take the forts after her act of secession from the Union. And his only apology for such a course is that he has received what he deems sufficient assurances that she will not do so during the few remaining days of his Administration. Buchanan, therefore, understands perfectly that it is the intention of South Carolina to seize the forts, possibly during his term, and instantly at the accession of his successor at the latest. Yet he refuses to lift a finger toward putting them in a defensible position. He deems it no part of his duty certainly no part which he intends to fulfill — to protect the country from any evils which do not threaten it during his Administration. He is perfectly willing to scuttle the ship if he can only get ashore. This is his conception of patriotism and public duty. Suppose, on the morning after Lincoln's inauguration, the fort should be attacked, and that Major Anderson and his command, acting under Buchanan's orders, should be sacrificed in its defense. Upon whose head would rest the responsibility? Who would answer for their blood? Against whom would the execrations of an indignant nation be hurled 1 Not Lincoln, for he will have had no opportunity to do an act or say a word for their relief. Buchanan will be held responsible, by public opinion, for every life that may be lost, and for every drop of blood that may be shed in that contingency. He will carry into private life a heavier weight of responsibility, and more scathing curses from the American people, than have ever hitherto followed any high officer into his retirement.

At any time previous to secession Buchanan might have sent troops to Fort Moultrie, without dispute or doubt of his authority from any quarter. It was universally conceded that the fort was the property of the United States, and that it was the duty of the President to protect and defend it. After secession, South Carolina will claim it as her property, and although the claim is utterly worthless, many beyond that State will regard it as a basis of opposition to the action of the General Government. And the result, in either case, must be the same. The greatest curse that can befall a nation is to have a traitor, a coward, or an imbecile at its head in a great crisis of its affairs. Buchanan seems determined, upon his retirement, to hand over the whole power of the Government to the disunionists, instead of the man whom the people have elected President. The first duty, as it will be the first necessity, of Lincoln, will be to reclaim the authority thus basely betrayed. We trust there will prove to be vigor enough in our Government not only to accomplish this result but also to punish treason, wherever it may be found.— N. Y. Times, Dec. 20th. .^C-:-;i

Alexander Dumas is publishing in his Neapolitan journal, L'lndependente, various documents intended to prove that the success of Garibaldi's Neapolitan campaign is due, in a great measure, to his co-operation. „.&-3*>-g§s „ The . number of slaves in Maryland is found by ♦5!» ccn *!?_'' to have been diminished more inmhll ° * ho ? Band since 1850. The whole number now » about seventy-five thousand.